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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Garlock, Inc. ("Garlock") and Owens Corning Fiberglas 
Corp. ("Owens") appeal the District Court's orders denying 
their motions to alter or amend a judgment holding them 
liable for Charles Greenleaf, Jr.'s injuries in this strict 
liability asbestos products action. We address six of the 
issues tendered for resolution. Appellants argue that: (1) 
Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule precludes Greenleaf's 
entire federal action; (2) issue preclusion prevents 
relitigation of damages in federal court; (3) the District 
Court's jury instructions inadequately informed the jurors 
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regarding Pennsylvania law; (4) inflammatory statements by 
plaintiffs' counsel prejudiced the jury; (5) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of liability 
on the part of Garlock; and (6) the jury's verdict absolving 
the non-appearing defendants of liability was against the 
clear weight of the evidence.1 
 
We agree with the appellants that issue preclusion 
prevented relitigation of damages in this action and that a 
new trial is required to consider the non-appearing 
defendants' liability. We find appellants' remaining claims 
unavailing. Accordingly, we will reverse in part and affirm 
in part the District Court's orders. 
 
I. Background 
 
Naomi and Charles Greenleaf filed this diversity action in 
March, 1990, against ten defendants, including Owens and 
Garlock, both manufacturers of asbestos products. The 
complaint alleged that occupational exposure to asbestos 
products produced, or used by, the various defendants had 
caused Mr. Greenleaf to contract mesothelioma, a cancer 
caused exclusively by asbestos inhalation. Mr. Greenleaf 
sought damages for pain and suffering, and Mrs. Greenleaf 
sought damages for loss of consortium. Appellants filed 
answers denying responsibility and asserted crossclaims for 
contribution against all co-defendants. 
 
Two months after filing their federal action, the 
Greenleafs filed a state action in the Delaware County 
Court of Common Pleas against five Pennsylvania 
defendants alleging identical claims. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Greenleaf died from mesothelioma soon thereafter, and Mrs. 
Greenleaf pursued his federal and state claims as executrix 
of his estate. In July, 1991, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation stayed Greenleaf's federal action 
and transferred it, along with other pending federal 
asbestos related personal injury actions, to Judge Weiner in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our resolution of these issues makes it unnecessary to address 
appellants' arguments (1) that the award for loss of consortium was 
excessive, and (2) that the judgment must be altered to set-off the 
Manville Trust's share of the liability for Greenleaf's injuries. 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
While the federal action was stayed, Greenleaf pursued 
her state action, which proceeded to a reverse bifurcated 
trial in January 1995. Under this format, damages were 
considered in Phase I and liability in Phase II. The jury 
returned a Phase I verdict assessing damages of $151,870 
for the estate, and $37,500 for loss of consortium. 
Greenleaf filed a motion for additur. Prior to 
commencement of Phase II, however, Greenleaf settled with 
the two non-bankrupt Pennsylvania defendants and 
executed releases in their favor. The record does not 
disclose the settlement terms. Pursuant to Greenleaf's 
request, the Court of Common Pleas marked the state 
action "settled, discontinued and ended" on January 24, 
1995. 
 
Two years later, Greenleaf reactivated this federal action. 
Appellants filed motions for summary judgment contending 
that Pennsylvania's "one satisfaction" rule barred 
relitigation of Greenleaf's asbestos claims in federal court, 
and alternatively that issue preclusion prevented 
relitigation of damages. The District Court denied both 
motions. Once again, trial proceeded in a reverse bifurcated 
format. Owens and Garlock were the only defendants to 
appear and actively participate in the trial.2 The jury's 
Phase I verdict fixed damages at $250,000 for the estate 
and $1.6 million for loss of consortium. Greenleaf's trial 
presentation in Phase II focused primarily upon 
establishing their liability for Mr. Greenleaf's injuries. 
Appellants also presented evidence to prove the non- 
appearing defendants' liability on their crossclaims. The 
jury's Phase II verdict found Owens and Garlock exclusively 
liable for those damages and absolved all non-appearing 
defendants of liability for Greenleaf's injuries. 
 
Appellants filed separate post verdict motions requesting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court granted defendants John Crane Inc., Chesterton, 
Inc., and SEPCO's motions for summary judgment dismissing them from 
the action. The remaining defendants (Johns-Manville, Owens-Illinois, 
Uniroyal, Fireboard, and Hopeman Brothers) did not appear at trial. 
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remittitur, and modification of the judgment. These motions 
asserted numerous grounds for relief including claims that 
Greenleaf 's prior state settlement had preclusive effect 
upon this subsequent federal action, and that a new trial 
was required on appellants' crossclaims regarding the non- 
appearing defendants' liability. Owens and Garlock appeal 
from the District Court's orders denying these motions. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Preclusive Effect of the Prior State Litigation 
 
Appellants claim that Pennsylvania's "one recovery" rule 
barred Greenleaf 's entire action, and alternatively, that 
Pennsylvania's doctrine of issue preclusion estopped 
Greenleaf from relitigating damages in federal court. To 
determine the preclusive effect of Greenleaf's prior state 
action we must look to the law of the adjudicating state. 
See Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 48 (3d. Cir. 1997); 
O'Leary v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1064 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 
1988). We must give the acts of Pennsylvania's courts the 
same full faith and credit in federal court that they would 
enjoy in Pennsylvania's courts. See Gregory, 843 F.2d at 
116 (citing 28 U.S.C. S 1738). Because the District Court's 
application of these doctrines solely involves questions of 
law our review is plenary. See Huck, 106 F.3d at 48; 
O'Leary, 923 F.2d at 1065. 
 
1. Pennsylvania's "One Satisfaction" Rule 
 
Under Pennsylvania law: 
 
       A plaintiff who is injured at the hands of more than 
       one tort-feasor may sue and recover a judgment 
       against any one or all of the tort-feasors and may 
       attempt to collect the damages awarded by the 
       judgment against any one or all of them. However, 
       although a plaintiff may obtain a judgment against 
       several tort-feasors for the same harm, he or she is 
       entitled to only one satisfaction for that harm. 
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Brandt v. Eagle, 602 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(en banc) (citing Thompson v. Fox, 192 A. 107 (Pa. 1937)); 
see Franklin Decorators, Inc. v. Kalson, 479 A.2d 3 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984). "[T]he `one satisfaction' rule bars a 
subsequent suit against another tortfeasor only where the 
prior proceedings can reasonably be construed to have 
resulted in a full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim." Frank 
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. of W. Germany, 522 F.2d 321, 
324-26 (3d Cir. 1975). Full satisfaction may arise from a 
settlement with less than all tortfeasors. See id. at 326. 
Determining whether a plaintiff has been fully satisfied 
through a settlement, however, involves a highly factually 
sensitive analysis of "the circumstances of the prior 
settlement to see whether the satisfaction . . . `represent[ed] 
the true value of the claim.' " Frank, 522 F.2d at 326 
(quoting Blanchard v. Wilt, 188 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1963)). The 
party asserting "one satisfaction," therefore, has the burden 
to provide the court with record evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the settlement. The record in 
this case, however, contains virtually no evidence relating 
to Greenleaf 's state settlement. Because appellants have 
failed to carry their burden, we cannot conclude that 
Greenleaf 's federal action was barred by Pennsylvania's one 
satisfaction rule.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Appellants rely almost exclusively upon Brandt v. Eagle, 602 A.2d 
1364, to support their "one satisfaction" claim. Brandt belongs to a line 
of Pennsylvania cases standing for the proposition that where a plaintiff 
obtains a judgment and the "judgment is marked satisfied . . . 
[Pennsylvania] law presumes that full satisfaction for the harm incurred 
has been received." Id. at 1367; see Hilbert v. Roth, 149 A.2d 648 (Pa. 
1959) ("[W]hen the plaintiff has [a judgment] marked satisfied of record, 
the common law assumption that he is satisfied may reasonably be 
permitted to operate."); Frank, 522 F.2d at 326. Courts have construed 
this conclusive presumption narrowly applying it only to cases where 
there has been a "judgment entered as satisfied" on the docket. See 
Blanchard, 188 A.2d at 725 (noting that Hilbert "must be limited to its 
own factual situation"). As the District Court correctly noted, however, 
"this is not a case where a judgment was adjudicated let alone satisfied." 
Accordingly, we find appellants' reliance upon this line of cases 
misplaced. 
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2. Issue Preclusion 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, issue preclusion applies where: 
 
       (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication wa s 
       identical with the one presented in the later action; 
 
       (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; 
 
       (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted wa s a 
       party or in privity with a party to the prior 
       adjudication; and 
 
       (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full 
       and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in 
       a prior action. 
 
Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 
1996)(citing Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996), 
and Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 668 
(Pa. 1975)). The parties agree that this is the correct 
standard and that factors one, three, and four are present 
in this case. They disagree, however, regarding the second 
factor: whether the state jury's damages verdict is a "final 
judgment." 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consults section 13 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to define "final 
judgments" for purposes of issue preclusion. See Shaffer, 
673 A.2d at 875. Section 13 provides: 
 
       The rules of res judicata are applicable only when a 
       final judgment is rendered. However, for purposes of 
       issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger and 
       bar), "final judgment" includes any prior adjudication 
       of an issue in another action that is determined to be 
       sufficiently firm to be accorded preclusive effect. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 13 (1982). The 
comments to section 13 emphasize that issue preclusion is 
applicable when it is determined "that the decision to be 
carried over was adequately deliberated and firm, even if 
not final in the sense of forming the basis for a judgment 
already entered." Id. S 13 cmt. g. 
 
       [To require that] a final judgment in the strict sense 
       has been reached in the first action can involve 
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       hardship--either needless duplication of effort and 
       expense in the second action to decide the same issue, 
       or, alternatively, postponement of decision of the issue 
       in the second action for a possibly lengthy period of 
       time until the first action has gone to a completefinish. 
       In particular circumstances the wisest course is to 
       regard the prior decision of the issue as final for the 
       purpose of issue preclusion without awaiting the end 
       judgment. 
 
Id. Accordingly, the Restatement recognizes that the finality 
inquiry focuses upon "whether the conclusion in question is 
procedurally definite." Id. Section 13's comments provide a 
number of factors to be considered in this regard: 
 
       (1) whether the prior decision was "adequately 
       deliberated and firm" and not "avowedly tentative"; 
 
       (2) whether the parties were fully heard; 
 
       (3) whether the court supported its decision with a 
       reasoned opinion; 
 
       (4) whether the court's prior decision was subject  to 
       appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal. 
 
Id. One of section 13's illustrations provides an example 
particularly instructive in this appeal: 
 
       In a jurisdiction that permits "split" trials (a trial of 
       liability followed, if liability is found, by a separate trial 
       to ascertain the damages), the jury in a negligence case 
       finds for the plaintiff A as to liability, the defendant B 
       having denied his own negligence and pleaded 
       contributory negligence on the part of A. Under the law 
       of the jurisdiction, B cannot appeal at this point as 
       there is no judgment that qualifies as final for that 
       purpose; an appealable judgment would be reached 
       later, when, in the second phase of the trial, another 
       jury assessed the damages. But prior to the second 
       phase, the jury's verdict as to liability may be held 
       conclusive as to the issues of A's and B's negligence in 
       any other action between them in which the same 
       issues appear. 
 
Id. S 13 cmt. g, illus. 3 (emphasis added). 
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We conclude that Greenleaf's prior state court jury 
verdict on damages is a "final judgment" under section 13 
and carries issue preclusive effect upon that issue in this 
action. As the above-quoted illustration indicates, 4 weighing 
the factors set forth in section 13's comments favors a 
finding of sufficient finality in circumstances like those 
before us. The parties were "fully heard" on the issue of 
damages and the jury's verdict was "adequately deliberated 
and firm." The jury's decision would have been appealable 
following Phase II, had no settlement occurred. Pursuant to 
the settlement, the Greenleafs voluntarily surrendered their 
right to further review, and the dismissal order entered 
pursuant to that settlement assured that the assessment of 
damages was "procedurally definite" and not subject to 
change. Under these circumstances, we perceive no 
justification for permitting the Greenleafs to relitigate the 
amount of their damages.5 
 
The District Court concluded that the state jury's 
damages verdict did not preclude relitigation of the 
damages issue in federal court for two reasons. We find 
both unpersuasive. First, the District Court cited our 
decision in Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d 542 (3d 
Cir. 1996), for the proposition that settlement following a 
reverse bifurcation verdict on damages is not an 
adjudication. Dici does not stand for that proposition, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Greenleaf attempts to distinguish this illustration by arguing that it, 
like the comments to section 13 generally, deals with a "same party" 
situation and neither Owens nor Garlock were parties to the state 
proceedings. While it is true that the comments and illustrations deal 
predominantly with "same party" situations, issue preclusion in 
Pennsylvania does not require identity of parties. Phillip v. Clark, 560 
A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (" `There is no requirement that 
there be an identity of parties in the two actions in order to invoke 
[issue 
preclusion].' " (quoting Mellon Bank v. Rafsky, 535 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1987))); cf. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merchant 
Marine Co., Ltd., 63 F.3d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
5. We observe that our conclusion is consistent with the modern trend to 
"relax[ ] traditional views of the finality requirement by applying issue 
preclusion to matters resolved by preliminary rulings or to 
determinations of liability that have not yet been completed by an award 
of damages or other relief." Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 4434 at 321 (1981 & 1998 Supp.). 
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however. In Dici this court considered whether the factual 
findings of a state workmen's compensation referee had 
preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court action for 
violations of Title VII and state antidiscrimination statutes. 
Id. at 545-47. The case involved neither a reverse bifurcated 
proceeding, nor a jury verdict, nor a settlement. Id. Instead, 
we determined that issue preclusion did not apply because 
the issues presented in the two proceedings were not the 
same. Id. at 549-50. 
 
The District Court's second reason for refusing to apply 
issue preclusion was the preliminary verdict's lack of 
immediate appealability. While noting that appealability is 
only a factor for determining the appropriateness of issue 
preclusion, the Court relied upon section 28(1) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments for the proposition 
that issue preclusion did not apply because Greenleaf 
"could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the 
preliminary verdict." We find the District Court's reliance 
upon the preliminary verdict's appealability misplaced. 
 
Section 28 establishes various exceptions to the doctrine 
of issue preclusion. It provides in relevant part: 
 
       Although an issue is actually litigated and determined 
       by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is 
       essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a 
       subsequent action between the parties is not precluded 
       in the following circumstances. 
 
        (1) The party against whom preclusion is sought 
       could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of 
       the judgment in the initial action. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 28 (1982). 
According to the comments, review is "unavailable as a 
matter of law" where "the controversy has become moot, or 
because the law does not allow review of the particular 
category of judgments." Id. S 28 cmt. a. The comments 
further provide that the exception does not apply where 
"review is available but not sought." Id.  
 
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted 
section 28, Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1985), it 
has not specifically addressed the scope of the section 28(1) 
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exception. This court, however, has addressed similar 
issues regarding the significance of appealability for 
purposes of issue preclusion under the Restatement. Our 
decisions hold that decisions not final for purposes of 
appealability may nevertheless be sufficientlyfinal to have 
issue preclusive effect. For example, in In re Brown, 951 
F.2d 564, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1991), we concluded that a state 
court's partial summary judgment establishing a debtor's 
liability in a mortgage foreclosure action was sufficiently 
final to have issue preclusive effect in a subsequent 
bankruptcy proceeding, even though the judgment was not 
final for purposes of appealability because the amount due 
on the mortgage remained to be determined in state court. 
We explained: 
 
       Unlike claim preclusion, the effectiveness of issue 
       preclusion, sometimes called collateral estoppel, does 
       not require the entry of a judgment, final in the sense 
       of being appealable. . . . `Finality for purposes of issue 
       preclusion is a more `pliant' concept than it would be 
       in other contexts.' Finality `may mean little more than 
       that the litigation of a particular issue has reached 
       such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for 
       permitting it to be litigated again.' 
 
Id. at 569 (quoting Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 412 & 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1980)). We determined that issue preclusion 
was justified observing that (i) the party against whom 
issue preclusion was asserted was represented by counsel 
in the prior state action, (ii) hearings were held in state 
court, (iii) the trial court's summary judgment order was 
not "tentative," and (iv) allowing relitigation in bankruptcy 
court would waste judicial resources. Id. at 570. 
 
Similarly, in Burlington Northern R.R. v. Hyundai 
Merchant Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1233 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1995), we found a denial of summary judgment sufficiently 
final to justify issue preclusion in a subsequent action even 
though it was not immediately appealable as a matter of 
law. We noted that (i) the party was represented by counsel 
in the prior action, (ii) the issues were genuinely contested, 
and (iii) the lower court's denial of summary judgment was 
not "tentative." See id. These elements are also satisfied in 
this case. In the prior state action (i) Greenleaf was 
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represented by counsel, (ii) the issue of damages was 
genuinely contested in a jury trial, (iii) the verdict was not 
tentative, and (iv) allowing damages to be relitigated in 
federal court clearly wasted judicial resources. 
 
We do not attempt to fully chart section 28(1)'s scope in 
this case. We simply hold that reading section 13 and 
section 28(1) together, we find that the lack of immediate 
appealability of Greenleaf's preliminary state damages 
verdict does not operate to prevent its issue preclusive 
effect in this case. Appellate review would have been 
available had the Greenleafs not chosen to settle. 6 Allowing 
Greenleaf to relitigate damages in federal court was 
unnecessarily duplicative and a waste of valuable judicial 
resources -- the precise evils that issue preclusion is 
designed to combat. See Shaffer, 673 A.2d at 875 ("[Issue 
preclusion] relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. While we find it unnecessary to define section 28(1)'s scope to resolve 
this case, we observe that courts typically apply it to the narrow set of 
judgments where a party has no right to appeal at any time because 
such appeals are wholly unavailable "as a matter of law." See Wright et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 4433 at 315 (1981 & 1998 
Supp.)("[Courts must distinguish] between decisions that could not ever 
be appealed and decisions that will become eligible for appeal in the 
future. Relaxation of the traditional views of finality has created the 
opportunity to rest preclusion on a decision that cannot be appealed at 
present but may be appealed and reversed in the future."). For example, 
some courts have applied section 28(1) to "[a] District Court's 
jurisdictional findings incident to remand" because remand orders are 
wholly unappealable as a matter of law under 28 U.S.C. S 1447(d). See, 
e.g., Nutter v. Monongahela Power Co., 4 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Southern Leasing Corp. v. Tufts, 804 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991). Similarly, other courts have applied section 28(1) to allow a party 
who generally prevailed in a prior judgment, but lost on certain issues, 
to relitigate the issues upon which they were unsuccessful because the 
party was " `not aggrieved and could not appeal the judgment [as a 
matter of law].' " See, e.g., Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 
1122 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson-Cottonwood Disposal Serv. v. 
W.C.A.B., 135 Cal.App.3d 326, 332, 185 Cal.Rptr. 336, 340 (1982)); In re 
DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1993) see also Hernandez v. Region 
Nine Housing Corp., 684 A.2d 1385, 1393 (N.J. 1996)(section 28(1) 
prevented issue preclusion of EEOC's adverse decision on Title VII claim 
because no appellate review of EEOC decision exists). The Greenleafs' 
preliminary verdict does not fall into this category of cases. 
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multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by 
preventing inconsistent decisions encourage[s] reliance on 
adjudication."). 
 
B. Adequacy of the Jury Instructions 
 
Appellants assert that the District Court's jury 
instructions inadequately informed the jurors regarding 
Pennsylvania law on asbestos related injuries. Our 
standard of review over this issue is mixed. We exercise 
plenary review to determine whether the District Court's 
jury instructions misstated Pennsylvania law. See Woodson 
v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir. 1997). In the 
absence of a misstatement, however, we review the District 
Court's decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of 
discretion. See Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 
184, 191 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Unless a trial judge misstates the 
law, the judge's rulings on points for charge may be 
reversed only if the judge committed an abuse of 
discretion."). 
 
Appellants raise two arguments to persuade us that the 
District Court's instruction misstated Pennsylvania law. 
First, they both claim that the court failed to specifically 
instruct the jury regarding the Eckenrod "frequency, 
regularity and proximity" test, which they claim is the 
exclusive rule in asbestos cases under Pennsylvania law. 
Second, Garlock contends that the court erred in not 
submitting its proposed "de minimis" exposure defense to 
the jury. 
 
The District Court's instruction in this case charged the 
jury: 
 
       . . . [F]ocus on the asbestos products manufactured 
       and distributed by each particular defendant. . . .[If] 
       the product in [sic] particular of a defendant was 
       defective in the sense that it lacked an adequate 
       warning, the defendant is liable if that condition is the 
       legal cause of the harm, that is if it is a substantial 
       factor in bringing about the harm to Charles Greenleaf. 
       . . . A substantial factor is a real actual factor even 
       though the result may be unusual, unforseen, 
       unforeseeable or unexpected but it is not an imaginary 
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       or fanciful factor having no connection or only an 
       insignificant connection with the injury. There may be 
       more than one substantial factor in bringing about the 
       harm suffered by the plaintiff. . . . What this means in 
       this case is that for a defendant to be liable, plaintiffs 
       must show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that 
       Charles Greenleaf was exposed to that defendant's 
       product and that such exposure was a substantial 
       factor in bringing about his injuries. 
 
(JA 434-443) (emphasis added). 
 
The District Court's charge thus told the jury that the 
plaintiffs had the burden of proving proximate cause and 
explained that concept to them. It further cautioned that 
the jury must conduct a separate analysis of the evidence, 
and make a separate decision on, the proximate cause 
issue with respect to each defendant. The District Court's 
charge on these points is entirely consistent with our 
understanding of the Pennsylvania case law in asbestos 
cases. 
 
We do not understand the appellants to contend that 
anything said by the District Court is inconsistent with 
Pennsylvania law. Rather, they contend that the Superior 
Court in Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 53 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988), held that any charge in an asbestos case 
is deficient if it fails specifically to require evidence of "the 
frequency of the use of the product and the regularity of 
plaintiff's employment is proximity thereto." 
 
In Eckenrod, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a 
grant of summary judgment in favor of various asbestos 
manufacturers because the plaintiff had failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of the decedent's exposure to the 
defendants' products. The Court summarized the principles 
governing liability in an asbestos action: 
 
       In order for liability to attach in a products liability 
       action, the plaintiff must establish that the injuries 
       were caused by a product of the particular 
       manufacturer or supplier. Additionally, in order for a 
       plaintiff to defeat a motion for summary judgment a 
       plaintiff must present evidence to show that he inhaled 
       asbestos fibers shed by the specific manufacturer's 
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       product. Therefore, a plaintiff must establish more 
       than the presence of asbestos in the workplace; he 
       must prove that he worked in the vicinity of the 
       products use. Summary judgment is proper when the 
       plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendant's 
       products were the cause of plaintiff's injury. 
 
       * * * 
 
       We acknowledge that the facts establish that the 
       decedent on occasion was exposed to asbestos; there is 
       no evidence, however, as to the regularity or nature of 
       decedent's contact with asbestos. Moreover, there is no 
       testimony establishing that Mr. Eckenrod worked with 
       asbestos supplied and/or manufactured by Porter or A- 
       Best or any of the other appellees. The mere fact that 
       appellees' asbestos products came into the facility does 
       not show that the decedent ever breathed these specific 
       asbestos products or that he worked where these 
       asbestos products were delivered. 
 
Id. at 53. 
 
We do not read Eckenrod as establishing any additional 
or special requirements for jury instructions in asbestos 
cases. Rather, we read it as a straightforward application of 
traditional principles of summary judgment and proximate 
cause law to a factual pattern, various permutations of 
which arise frequently in asbestos cases. 
 
Accordingly, it is not surprising to us to find post- 
Eckenrod opinions in which the Superior Court has 
sustained jury verdicts where the court's discussions did 
not contain the "frequency, regularity and proximity" test 
appellants urge as essential.7See, e.g., Juliano v. Johns- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We find further support for our conclusion in Jobe v. W.P. Metz 
Refining, 664 A.2d 1015 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), where the Superior Court 
extended the Eckenrod principles of asbestos liability to product 
liability 
cases involving cadmium, another carcinogenic substance. The court 
discerned from the "Eckonrod line of cases" that an asbestos plaintiff 
must prove three elements: (i) that the employee/decedent was at a 
particular work site, (ii) that the employee/decedent was exposed to 
carcinogenic-containing products at that site, and (iii) that a 
defendant's 
carcinogenic-containing products was [sic] at the that particular work 
site at or about the same time as the employee/decedent. Id. at 1019. 
Notably absent from the court's summary of asbestos liability law was 
the Eckenrod "frequency, regularity and proximity" formula. 
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Manville Corp., 611 A.2d 238, 239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); 
Ottavio v. Fireboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992); Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 596 A.2d 203, 209 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). We find Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 
596 A.2d 203, particularly instructive because it involved 
facts strikingly similar to this appeal. There, as here, the 
Superior Court, considered a challenge to the adequacy of 
jury instructions in an appeal from a judgment in favor of 
an asbestosis plaintiff. The trial court instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's product 
was a "substantial factor in bringing about the harm" and 
that: 
 
       plaintiff must present evidence which establishes that 
       he inhaled asbestos fibers which came from the 
       manufacture's [sic] product. It is not enough simply to 
       show that the product was delivered to the work place. 
       He must show that he actually worked in the vicinity 
       of the product and that he inhaled asbestos fibers from 
       that product . . . Remember there may be several 
       substantial factors. There are no requirements [sic] 
       there be a single substantial factor. As long as youfind 
       that there is a real factor that's not something fanciful 
       or something imaginary, but something that came 
       about because of what happened. 
 
Id. The Superior Court concluded that this"jury charge 
adequately comports with the mandate of Eckenrod and 
that the trial court was not required to provide any more 
precise explanation than that actually given." Id. at 210. 
While relying heavily upon Eckenrod the court did not 
invoke a "frequency, regularity and proximity" test. See id. 
at 209. 
 
In the absence of a misstatement, we review the District 
Court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court's refusal to include 
appellants' proposed "frequency, regularity, and proximity" 
instructions.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We find no merit in appellants' claim that the District Court's Phase 
II verdict form was patently insufficient and oversimplified. Appellants 
submitted proposed verdict forms to the court, each posing three distinct 
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We similarly find Garlock's assertion that the District 
Court misstated Pennsylvania law by omitting Garlock's 
proposed "de minimis" exposure defense from the jury 
instruction unpersuasive. Again, we take guidance from 
Lilley where the Superior Court rejected a virtually identical 
argument stating that it was "unaware of any requirement 
of Pennsylvania law that the jury charge must include an 
instruction on de minimis exposure." Id. at 210. We have 
similarly found no such requirement, and conclude that the 
District Court did not err by refusing this instruction. 
 
C. Attorney Misconduct 
 
Appellants next contend that a new trial is required 
because allegedly inflammatory statements made by 
Greenleaf 's counsel in closing arguments prejudiced the 
jury. We review District Court decisions whether to grant a 
new trial because of alleged attorney misconduct for abuse 
of discretion. Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 
F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 1995); Fineman v. Armstrong World 
Indus. Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d Cir. 1992). This is 
because we recognize that " `[i]n matters of trial procedure 
. . . the trial judge is entrusted with wide discretion 
because he [or she] is in a far better position than we to 
appraise the effect of the improper argument of counsel.' " 
Fineman, 980 F.2d at 207 (quoting Reed v. Philadelphia 
Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 939 F.2d 128, 133 (3d 
Cir. 1991)). A new trial may be granted only where the 
improper statements "made it `reasonably probable' that the 
verdict was influenced by prejudicial statements." Id. (citing 
Draper v. Airco Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 
Appellants point to three alleged incidents of misconduct. 
First, they argue that Greenleaf 's counsel suggested that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
questions. The District Court, however, fashioned its own form, which 
presented one question: "Are the following defendants liable?" A list of 
the defendants followed the question. As we have concluded above, the 
court's jury instructions adequately covered the substantive law's 
requirements regarding liability. They were relatively straightforward and 
it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to refuse to 
repeat them in the verdict form. 
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Greenleaf would not recover anything unless the jury 
returned a verdict against the defendants. This was 
allegedly improper and prejudicial because Greenleaf had 
already received compensation for their injuries in the state 
settlement. Second, Garlock contends that counsel 
distracted the jury's attention from the relevant issues by 
irrelevant commentary on the failure of the absent 
defendants to defend. Finally, appellants complain that 
Greenleaf's counsel suggested to the jury that a verdict for 
plaintiffs would "send a message to the folks at Owens."9 
 
These comments do not approach the level of attorney 
misconduct found to prejudice the jury in our precedents. 
See, e.g., Blanche Road, 57 F.3d at 264; Fineman, 980 F.2d 
at 207-10; Draper, 580 F.2d at 95. We conclude that it is 
not reasonably probable that the verdict was prejudicially 
influenced by Greenleaf 's counsel's remarks, and we find 
no abuse of discretion in the District Court's denial of 
appellants' requests for a new trial on this ground. 
 
D. Denial of Motions For a New Trial 
 
Finally, appellants contend that the District Court erred 
when it denied their motions for a new trial. They present 
two arguments. First, Garlock presents a classic 
insufficiency of the evidence argument claiming that the 
evidence does not support a finding that it is liable for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Owens Corning cites Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., Ltd., 496 F.2d 
788, 792 (3d Cir. 1974), for the proposition that inviting the jury to 
"send a message" is by itself outrageous enough to warrant a new trial, 
particularly in a strict liability case where conduct is not at issue. We 
find Foster unhelpful. Foster did not erect a per se rule against 
invitations to a jury to "send a message", nor did it involve products 
liability. In Foster, we granted a new trial because the jury had been 
prejudiced by counsel's improper remarks regarding (i) the disparity of 
wealth between parties (ii) the defendant's foreign ownership, and (iii) 
the 
plaintiff 's potential burden upon the community if the defendant was 
not found liable. See id. at 792. We have relied upon Foster to hold that 
it is improperly prejudicial for counsel to appeal to financial disparity 
between parties before the jury. See Draper, 580 F.2d at 95. Greenleaf 's 
counsel did not emphasize the parties' financial disparity and none of 
the remaining Foster factors are present in this case. Accordingly, we 
find Owens Corning's argument unavailing. 
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Greenleaf 's injuries. Second, both appellants claim that the 
verdict absolving the non-appearing defendants is against 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The Greenleafs 
respond that appellants are precluded from asserting these 
claims under our holding in Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 
F.2d 1255, 1262 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
1. The Verdict Against Garlock 
 
We cannot reach the merits of Garlock's first claim 
because it did not move for judgment as a matter of law 
under Rule 50 before the jury retired to deliberate. It is well 
settled that a party who does not file a Rule 50 motion for 
judgment as a matter of law at the end of the evidence is 
not thereafter entitled to have judgment entered in its favor 
notwithstanding an adverse verdict on the ground that 
there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. See 
Lowenstein v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 536 F.2d 9, 11 (3d 
Cir. 1976). However, "the failure to move for a directed 
verdict at the close of all evidence does more than limit an 
aggrieved party's remedy to a new trial. In this Circuit, it 
wholly waives the right to mount any post-trial attack on 
the sufficiency of the evidence." Yohannon, 924 F.2d at 
1262; see also Stadtlander Drug Co., Inc. v. Brock Control 
Sys. Inc., 174 F.R.D. 637, 641 (W.D. Pa. 1997)(refusing to 
consider Rule 59 motions for a new trial based upon 
insufficiency of the evidence where the movant did not 
move for judgment as a matter of law before the jury retired 
to deliberate). The record does not indicate that Garlock 
moved for judgment as a matter of law; its failure to do so 
operates as a waiver with fatal consequences to its 
insufficiency of the evidence claim in this appeal.10 
 
2. The Verdict in Favor of the Non-Appearing Defendants 
 
Appellants also claim that the jury's verdict is against the 
clear weight of the evidence to the extent it absolved the 
non-appearing defendants of liability. They ask for a new 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Garlock claims that its proposed jury instruction number one was a 
request for judgment as a matter of law. The instruction cannot be so 
construed. 
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trial at which they will once again seek a judgment in their 
favor on their cross-claims against the non-appearing 
defendants. We disagree with Greenleaf 's suggestion that 
Yohannon precludes our consideration of this claim. 
 
A court may order a new trial upon the motion of a party 
or sua sponte where there is insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict or where the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)-(d); Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure S 2806 (1995). 
Yohannon circumscribes a court's authority to act upon 
such a motion when a party is arguing that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict against it, and it is, 
accordingly, entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of 
law. Assuming that there is no substantial evidence to 
support the verdict, such an argument can be as 
successfully argued at the close of all the evidence, and 
Yohannon takes the position that a failure to advance it at 
that time waives the right to a new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence. 
 
The appellants here are not arguing insufficiency of the 
evidence, however. They acknowledge, as they must, that 
they had the burden of proof on their cross-claims, and 
they do not take the extreme position that the state of the 
record entitles them to judgment, i.e., that evidence the 
jury was not at liberty to reject dictated a judgment in their 
favor.11 Rather, they take the position that the court, 
utilizing its authority under Rule 59(a), should critically 
evaluate the evidence and exercise its discretion in favor of 
a new trial because the probative evidence in their favor as 
contrasted with that opposed is overwhelming. This is not 
a position that can be taken in support of a Rule 50 motion 
for judgment as a matter of law. Wright & Miller, S 2524, 
at 255-56 (indicating that a court in response to a Rule 50 
motion may not consider the credibility of the witness or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. A litigant with the burden of persuasion is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of the evidence only in the very rare case 
where a decision in its favor is mandated by evidence the trier of fact is 
not at liberty to disbelieve and no inference contrary to its position can 
be drawn from the undisputable facts. Wright & Miller, S 2535, at 328- 
29. 
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the weight of the evidence and must draw all inferences in 
favor of the party against whom the motion is made). 
 
We conclude that Yohannon was not intended to foreclose 
the grant of a new trial to parties in appellants' position. 
Given the state of the record at the close of the evidence 
they had every reason to expect that the jury, if it 
understood and rationally applied the court's instructions, 
would decide that they had carried their burden of 
persuasion. Moreover, they were not in a position to argue 
that evidence which the jury was not entitled to reject 
required it to infer that the exposure to each of the 
products of the non-appearing defendants was a 
substantial factor in causing Greenleaf's mesothelioma. 
Under these circumstances appellees did not waive their 
rights under Rule 59 by failing to move under Rule 50 for 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
We now turn to the merits of appellants' claim. We review 
a District Court's decision whether to grant a new trial on 
the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence for abuse of discretion. Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 
852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988). Deferential review is 
appropriate when considering whether a verdict is against 
the weight of the evidence "because the district court was 
able to observe the witnesses and follow the trial in a way 
that we cannot replicate by reviewing a cold record." Id. 
"[N]ew trials because the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence are proper only when the record shows that the 
jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where 
the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or 
shocks our conscience." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
With this deferential standard in mind we consider the 
record. Five co-defendants, Johns-Manville, Owens-Illinois, 
Uniroyal, Fireboard, and Hopeman Brothers, did not appear 
at trial to defend against Greenleaf's claims and appellants' 
counterclaims. The following uncontested evidence was 
presented against them at trial. In his video taped 
deposition Mr. Greenleaf described his occupational 
exposure to asbestos products. He worked as a shipfitter at 
Sun Ship for seven and one half years beginning in 1942. 
He did not personally handle asbestos materials, but he 
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worked in ship hulls where asbestos dust "sift[ed] down all 
the time" from asbestos containing pipe covering, mud, 
cloth and paneling being used above him. He estimated 
that he was exposed to asbestos products 90% of his time 
at Sun Ship and specifically identified (i) Johns-Manville as 
a manufacturer of the products used there, and (ii) 
Hopeman Bros. as a contractor using asbestos there. Mr. 
Greenleaf also worked at New York Ship for eight months 
as a shipfitter and experienced similar exposure to the 
same products for four of those months. This evidence thus 
establishes that Greenleaf was exposed to Johns-Manville 
and Hopeman Bros. asbestos for almost eight years. 
 
In 1953, Mr. Greenleaf began working at Westinghouse 
as a fabricator. He worked there, mainly building turbines, 
for more than 30 years until he retired in 1986. Greenleaf 
testified that, during his time at Westinghouse, he was 
exposed to asbestos containing rope, cloth, block, gaskets, 
and pipe covering, and personally worked with rope and 
gaskets. When asked what he meant by "exposed" Mr. 
Greenleaf explained: 
 
       Exposed to it because it was the same thing. They 
       might be working over top of you or right there next to 
       you and like I say with the air--there was no air 
       conditioning or nothing. If you need any air, you 
       opened an air hose someplace [sic] to give you some 
       air, which didn't help this situation. 
 
(JA 478). He estimated that he was exposed to cloth one 
third of his time, and block and pipe covering one quarter 
of his time each. He described how asbestos dust from 
block cutting permeated the air, stating that "everything 
you went to get against, got against your clothes because 
nobody went around cleaning these things up, you know. It 
was all--it was on everything." (JA 481). Mr. Greenleaf also 
noted that when the asbestos dust mixture was combined 
with water to create asbestos mud "[the dust] went right up 
to the air." (JA 482). When asked which manufacturers' 
asbestos products were used at Westinghouse he identified, 
among others, Johns-Manville and Owens-Illinois. 
Additionally, in another deposition Greenleaf was asked 
whether he was exposed to one manufacturer's product 
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more than another's during his tenure at Westinghouse. He 
responded: 
 
       A: I would say Johns-Manville might have been the 
       most popular, you know, the most used. 
 
       Q: Can you give us a percentage versus the other 
       ones? 
 
       A: I would say offhand maybe 50% would be that 
       company. 
 
(JA 372-73). Finally, Mr. Greenleaf stated that he never 
observed a warning on any of the asbestos products he saw 
at Sun Ship and Westinghouse. 
 
James Cyrus, a coworker who spent 80% of his time over 
almost 30 years working with Greenleaf at Westinghouse, 
provided additional evidence regarding Greenleaf's 
exposure. He testified that he and Mr. Greenleaf frequently 
used asbestos cloth manufactured by, among others, 
Johns-Manville, Uniroyal, and Fireboard, and that the cloth 
disintegrated from the heat and emitted asbestos dust. He 
also testified that Mr. Greenleaf worked with Uniroyal 
gaskets. Thus, Cyrus's and Greenleaf's testimony 
established that Greenleaf had been exposed to Uniroyal, 
Fireboard and Owens-Illinois products for 30 years, and 
added an additional 30 years to his prior exposure to 
Johns-Manville products. 
 
In addition to this, the non-appearing defendants' 
interrogatory answers were read to the jury. In them, the 
non-appearing defendants admitted to selling or using 
asbestos products. Finally, Greenleaf's expert witness 
testified, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that 
Greenleaf's exposure to asbestos in the workplace from 
1942 to 1976 was "the kind of exposure that would have 
led to the development of mesothelioma." (JA 237). 
 
The District Court instructed the jury that it mustfind 
essentially three elements to hold a defendant liable for 
Greenleaf's injuries. The jury had to determine that (i) a 
defendant's asbestos product was defective because it 
lacked a warning, (ii) Greenleaf was exposed to that 
defendant's product, and (iii) exposure to the product was 
a substantial factor in causing Greenleaf's mesothelioma. 
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The uncontested evidence satisfied each element with 
respect to each of the non-appearing defendants. First, the 
non-appearing defendants admitted to producing or using 
asbestos products in their interrogatory answers, and 
Greenleaf's uncontested testimony established that he had 
never seen a warning on any of the defendants' products. 
Second, Greenleaf and Cyrus provided undisputed 
testimony that he was exposed to each defendant's asbestos 
products: (i) Johns-Manville for approximately 38 years, (ii) 
Fireboard, Uniroyal and Owens-Illinois for 30 years, and 
(iii) Hopeman Bros. for approximately 8 years. Finally, 
Greenleaf's expert testified that Greenleaf's exposure to 
these products was the kind of exposure that caused 
mesothelioma. 
 
While the jury was not required to credit all of this 
uncontroverted evidence, and while it was not required to 
draw the causation inference for which Greenleaf 
contended, the record must be evaluated in light of the fact 
that the jury found for the plaintiff against Garlock and 
Owens. The jury found Garlock and Owens liable on the 
basis of virtually identical evidence and in the face of a 
rigorous defense. Particularly puzzling is the jury's finding 
that Johns-Manville was not liable when the evidence 
established that Greenleaf's exposure to Manville products 
far exceeded his exposure to either Garlock or Owens 
products. 
 
Given the evidence that the jury must have credited in 
returning the verdicts against Garlock and Owens, we can 
find no rational explanation for the jury's failure to find the 
non-appearing defendants liable as well. It may well be that 
the jury was reluctant to judge them liable without hearing 
their side of the story. But whatever may have been the 
reason for the verdicts in favor of the non-appearing 
defendants, we are left with the definite andfirm conviction 
that a mistake has been made and that a new trial on the 
cross-claims is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
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remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. On remand, the District Court will enter a 
judgment in the Greenleafs' favor against Garlock and 
Owens in an amount consistent with the amount of 
damages awarded them in state court.12  It will conduct a 
new trial on the crossclaims of Garlock and Owens against 
the non-appearing defendants. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that the District Court's September 2, 1997 order granted 
Greenleaf 's request for delay damages under Pennsylvania law. The 
District Court's award of $135,433.22 in delay damages was calculated 
based upon the federal jury's damages assessment. Because we conclude 
that issue preclusion prevented relitigation of damages, the District 
Court will have to recalculate delay damages on remand. 
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